Rattled In Rawalpindi

medium nocaption121144298Pakistan army could well find itself, strategically, at the crossroads after India’s strikes on air bases at the heart of the country. The reason is not just about India’s military dare or the damage caused from the attacks but the fundamental questions they have raised on Pak army’s long-held core strategic paradigm.Bleeding India by a thousand cuts, strategic depth and the nuclear bomb form the core of this doctrine. Pak army has followed this template for over five decades, which is how it has remained firmly in control internally, legitimised terrorism externally, and punched well above its weight with powers like US and China.So, what has Operation Sindoor done? Take the ‘thousand cuts’ policy started by Zia-ul-Haq. It was predicated on an assumption that there was low-intensity, low-cost conflict possible against India without it escalating into a full-scale conventional military war. This was drawn up after India asserted conventional superiority in 1971, leading to the formation of Bangladesh.It also relied on the international context of the day. The calculus was that post-1971, US will intervene to stop India in case it chose to escalate matters. The pressure through international institutions, financial implications and overall external pressure, Pakistan assessed, would not allow India to sustain a conventional military campaign. And so, Pakistan’s unique model of state-sponsored terrorism flourished.The notion that there can be no meaningful conventional response from India to Pakistan’s non-conventional, low-cost terror options has now been negated with Op Sindoor. The four-day military action showed that besides striking terror targets inside Pak territory, India was able to both escalate and sustain its campaign to the point that Pak air bases were denuded of any air defence.What Pakistan has not conceptually realised with time is that while state-sponsored terrorism may be a politically low-risk option for Islamabad, the risks of waging a conventional response have also reduced significantly in today’s context.To begin with, the global picture has changed. A transitioning world order has an increased tolerance to conventional military action. Military conflicts are a new normal across geographies, which provides the political space for limited action without much opprobrium.Next, innovations in military tech, particularly by way of drones and UAVs, have made available low-risk political options to democratic govts for conventional attacks, where human casualties can be kept at a minimum. In Op Sindoor, India never physically crossed LoC or the international border but was still able to inflict major damage on Pakistan.The ability to wage a low-risk conventional military battle is, however, linked to the availability of resources to access quality weaponry. India’s rising economic profile and political clout is a big plus on this count, a fact that Pakistan knew but has not adequately factored into its calculus.The second pillar in Pakistan’s paradigm is strategic depth. This has two facets to it: physical and political.In physical terms, this meant increasing geographical depth for Pakistan to not just lock India in a conventional conflict but also mount a counteroffensive. For this, Afghanistan has been critical. Here, India’s strategy to engage early with a new Taliban regime paid off.Pakistan, on the other hand, accuses Taliban of fomenting terrorism on Pak soil. Strategic depth, as a Pak concept, requires that it should at best strive for a friendly, dependent regime in Afghanistan and if not, at least have a neutral regime in place. Through its constant attacks on the current regime in Kabul, Pakistan now has a hostile Afghanistan to contend with.On the political side, this depth translated into rallying all Islamic countries behind Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. This did work for some decades but over the past few years, India has cultivated strong relationships with Gulf countries. For them, India is a big growth prospect that cannot be shrugged away for Pakistan. This was visible during Op Sindoor when Saudi Arabia and UAE stepped in to let Pakistan know that they wanted an end, not an escalation to the conflict.Finally, the nuclear weapon. This pillar is still at play as Pakistan is trying to make a case against India, alleging damage to nuclear facilities. However, the principal lesson is that over time, steps have got added to the military escalation ladder because of the qualitative improvement in weaponry. As a result, space has opened up for limited kinetic war before the limits of nuclear deterrence can be breached. This dilemma, as demonstrated in Op Sindoor, renders Pakistan’s nuclear option somewhat ineffective against India, further limited by the fact that it will not survive India’s second strike if it ever pursued that path.In many ways, this three-fold doctrine has probably outlived its course for Pakistan with India now politically and psychologically unencumbered to use the full array of military options at its disposal anytime it’s provoked. The worry for Islamabad/Rawalpindi is that it’s not just PoJK but entire Pakistan that will be considered fair play by New Delhi.As it hits the drawing board to rework its strategic basics, the limits of its all-weather friendship with China were also revealed. Beijing will stand behind Islamabad/Rawalpindi but not openly as a committed military ally.If it ever so happens in future, that would again provide a dangerous turn for India. But for now, China’s calculated stakes in Pakistan do not involve exposing itself to any military front. Short of that, Pakistan can get any help but its fighting frontiers with India are for it to handle alone. And that’s exactly the isolation which hit home along with the munitions that landed in Chaklala, barely half hour from Pak army’s military headquarters in Rawalpindi.Illustration: Chad Crowe, USA